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Introduction
Lisa M. Fairfax*
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.**

On March 2, 2012, The George Washington University Law
School's Center for Law, Economics & Finance and The George
Washington Law Review jointly hosted a symposium entitled "Striking
the Right Balance: Investor and Consumer Protection in the New Financial Marketplace."' The symposium received supporting grants
from the Institute for Law and Economic Policy and the Ewing
Marion Kauffman Foundation. We are most grateful to both sponsors
for their generous support.
The symposium focused on two principal topics. First, participants analyzed the impact of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank") 2 on investors and consumers in three areas of federal regulation-securities markets, derivatives markets, and consumer financial products. Second, the
symposium evaluated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SarbanesOxley")3 on its tenth anniversary and considered whether SarbanesOxley's legacy might offer any lessons as to the potential effectiveness
(or lack thereof) of Dodd-Frank's reforms.
The symposium benefited greatly from the perspectives of three
senior federal officials-Chairman Gary Gensler of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), Acting Chairman Martin J.
Gruenberg of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"),
and Steven B. Harris, a member of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board ("PCAOB"). Their responsibilities include implementation of various sections of Dodd-Frank, and all three officials
served on the staff of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs during the Committee's drafting of Sarbanes* Leroy Sorenson Merrifield Research Professor of Law and Director of Conference Programs for the Center for Law, Economics & Finance, The George Washington University Law
School.
** Professor of Law and Executive Director for the Center for Law, Economics & Finance,
The George Washington University Law School.
1 The agenda for the symposium and video clips of the keynote addresses and panel
discussions are currently available at http://www.law.gwu.edu/Academics/research-centers/CLEAF/Pages/PastEvents.aspx.
2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
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Oxley. Their symposium remarks are posted on their agencies' respective websites.4
This issue includes nine articles that grew out of presentations
and discussions that occurred during the symposium. As summarized
below, the nine articles address a variety of topics related to DoddFrank's reforms and Sarbanes-Oxley's legacy.
The first article, by Arthur Duff and David Zaring, provides a
concise overview of Dodd-Frank's new regime for regulating derivatives markets. 5 As they point out, Dodd-Frank marks a fundamental
change in approach from the Commodity Futures Modernization Act
of 2000 ("CFMA").6 The CFMA was a deregulatory statute that "effectively eliminat[ed] federal regulation of off-exchange derivatives
trading."7 The volume of over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives "exploded in the wake of the CFMA," rising from an aggregate notional
value of about $88 trillion in 1999 to over $670 trillion in 2008.8 The
financial crisis-including AIG's collapse after writing huge amounts
of credit default swaps-impelled Congress to enact Title VII of
Dodd-Frank, which brings derivatives markets under comprehensive
federal oversight. 9
Duff and Zaring explain that Title VII "overhauls the pre-crisis
approach by requiring reporting of swap transactions,

. .

. clearing of

many swaps to remove counterparty credit risk and hopefully reduce
systemic risk, oversight of the important participants in the derivatives
market, and prudential regulation to deal with systemic risk posed by
[derivatives] markets."10 Title VII divides regulatory responsibility for
this new regime between the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), which regulates security-based swaps, and the CFTC, which
4 See Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Remarks on DoddFrank Financial Reform at George Washington University Law School (Mar. 2, 2012), available
at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-106; Martin J. Gruenberg,
Acting Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks by FDIC Acting Chairman Martin J.
Gruenberg to George Washington University Law School (Mar. 2, 2012), availableat http://www.
fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2012/spmarO2l2.html; Steven B. Harris, Board Member,
Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., The Legacy of Sarbanes-Oxley and Its Implications for
Dodd-Frank (Mar. 2, 2012), available at http://pcaobus.org/News/SpeechlPages/03022012-Harris
GWU.aspx.
5 Arthur W.S. Duff & David Zaring, New Paradigmsand Familiar Tools in the New Derivatives Regulation, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 677 (2013).
6 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E, 114 Stat.
2763A-365.
7 Duff & Zaring, supra note 5, at 685.
8 Id. at 685.
9 Id. at 687-89, 693.
10 Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
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regulates all other swaps." Title VII's new regulatory tools-including reporting, clearing, capital, and margin requirements-are derived
from private market innovations that futures exchanges have successfully used since the nineteenth century. 12
Thus, in providing new regulatory powers to the SEC and CFTC,
"Dodd-Frank draws heavily from the private market mechanisms that
characterized early derivatives markets."'1 Duff and Zaring also suggest that "Title VII is meant to work as a thematic shift in derivatives
regulation towards a safety-and-soundness paradigm" similar to the
"European vision of banks serving as utilities for the rest of the economy." 14 Notwithstanding the favorable aspects of Title VII's reforms,
Duff and Zaring warn that Title VII's heavy reliance on clearinghouses for derivatives may have the unintended consequence of creating new centers of systemic risk in our financial markets.15
Michael Greenberger's article presents the case for stronger "position limits" that would prevent "excessive speculation" in commodities futures and related swap markets. 1 6 Speculators play an
important role in commodities markets by providing liquidity for
hedging and by assisting in price discovery.17 As Greenberger points
out, however, a primary purpose of the Commodity Exchange Act18
was to prevent "excessive speculation" that would injure producers
and consumers of commodities by driving market prices either far
above or far below the prices warranted by market fundamentals.19
In 1991, the CFTC issued rulings allowing large banks and other
institutional investors to use commodities swaps to make speculative
bets on commodities prices while avoiding the position limits applicable to futures markets. 2 0 The CFTC's "swaps loophole" has enabled
institutional investors to bet on commodities prices without owning
any of the subject commodities or investing in their production.2 1 By
11 Id. at 689.
12 See id. at 688, 702.
13 Id. at 702.
14 Id. at 701.
15 Id. at 705-06.
16 Michael Greenberger, Closing Wall Street's Commodity and Swaps Betting Parlors:Legal Remedies to Combat Needlessly Gambling up the Price of Crude Oil Beyond What Market
Fundamentals Dictate, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 707, 710-11 (2013).
17 See id. at 714.
18 Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. H§1-27f (2006)).
19 Greenberger, supra note 16, at 714-15.
20 Id. at 716.
21 Id.
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means of this off-exchange speculation, "[p]aper contracts are thereby
created that call for the making or taking of delivery of commodities
that are far in excess of the world inventory of those products." 22
Greenberger contends that "excessive speculation in the physical derivatives markets has caused unnecessary price volatility in crude oil
prices since 2008," which "has led to unnecessary and substantial increases in the prices that consumers pay for . . . gasoline and many

other energy and food staples."23
Section 737 of Dodd-Frank authorizes the CFTC to establish position limits to prevent excessive speculation in "not just classic futures markets, but all derivatives markets." 24 In October 2011, the
CFTC adopted a final rule establishing position limits for twenty-eight
commodity futures contracts related to oil prices. 25 However, two
months later, "Wall Street-dominated trade associations challenged
the CFTC's final position limits rule in federal district court," where
the district judge invalidated the rule as not mandated by Congress
under Dodd-Frank. 2 6 In view of continuing doubts about the CFTC's
authority to issue its position limits rule, Greenberger advocates new
federal legislation that would ban the use of what he believes to be the
"most damaging" investment vehicles in commodity staples derivatives markets-commodity index swaps and exchange traded funds. 27
Greenberger also urges the CFTC to use its new authority under
Dodd-Frank to bring enforcement actions to stop market manipulation in commodities prices. 28 However, the financial industry's allies
in Congress have significantly constrained the CFTC's ability to prosecute such cases by blocking increases in the CFTC's budget. 29 Greenberger therefore supports further legislative and regulatory steps to
"limit the scope of placing bets for gambling's sake on upward price
movements of energy and food staples worldwide."30
22

Id. at 719.

23

Id. at 721.

24

Id. at 720.

25

Id. at 736.

26 Id. at 739. In a 3-2 vote, the commissioners of the CFTC voted to move forward with an
appeal of the federal district court's decision vacating the position limits rule. Press Release,
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, CFTC Approves Position Limit Appeal (Nov. 15, 2012),
available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6413-12.
27

Greenberger, supra note 16, at 739-40.

28

Id. at 745.

29

Id. at 747.

30

Id. at 748.
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Jeffrey Manns' article addresses Dodd-Frank's attempt to reform
the regulation of credit ratings agencies ("CRAs"). 31 As Manns
points out, CRAs "faced a firestorm of blame for their role in fueling
the financial crisis. [CRAs] not only failed to identify credit risks but
also legitimized reckless risk taking through inflated ratings." 32 Unfortunately, Dodd-Frank's reforms for CRAs include three contradictory approaches. First, an "abolitionist" approach seeks to
"marginalize" CRAs by removing requirements for credit ratings
from federal statutes regulating investments by banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and other institutional investors.33 The "abolitionist" approach is undermined, however, by the fact that "no viable
alternative proxy for credit risk exists" and credit ratings "continue to
be a de facto requirement for most debt issues." 34 As a result, "the
removal of [regulatory] requirements for ratings has failed to have a
significant impact in the short run." 35
Second, a "private accountability" approach tries to improve the
reliability of credit ratings by imposing stronger governance and disclosure requirements on CRAs. 36 Dodd-Frank also increases the ability of investors to bring lawsuits against CRAs.37 When the SEC
attempted to impose expert liability on CRAs under the Securities
Act of 1933,38 however, CRAs "refused to allow the inclusion of their
ratings in registration statements"-a response that "threatened to
freeze asset-backed securities markets." 3 9 Faced with the CRAs' unified opposition, the SEC backed down and indefinitely suspended any
expert liability for CRAs, thereby creating "a gaping hole in terms of
private accountability."40
Third, a "regulated industry" approach gives the SEC greater
powers to regulate CRAs. 4 1 However, the SEC's new powers "skirt
the deeper issues" related to the conflicts of interest created by the
31

Jeffrey Manns, Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, 81 GEo.

WASH.

L.

REV.

749

(2013).
32
33
34

Id. at 771.
Id. at 771-72.
37 Id. at 773.
38 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15. U.S.C.
77a-77aa (2006)).
39 Manns, supra note 31, at 774.
40 Id. at 774.
41 Id. at 763-64, 776.
35

36

§§

Id. at 752.
Id. at 763-65.
Id. at 768, 770.
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present "issuer pays" system for buying credit ratings.42 In contrast,
the Franken Amendment to Dodd-Frank requires the SEC-based on
studies performed by the. Government Accountability Office
("GAO")-to consider potential alternatives to the "issuer pays"
system. 43
Manns reviews and critiques several alternatives studied by the
GAO. He notes that proposals for government-owned or investorowned rating agencies would involve their own conflicts of interest
because governments and investors are hardly disinterested with regard to credit ratings for debt securities." Proposals for random assignment or automatic rotation of CRAs for debt issues are flawed
because they would not "create incentives for [improvements in] rating agency accuracy." 45 Other proposals "in which rating agencies
compete and are compensated based on their performance" suffer
from the crucial shortcoming that "no clear consensus exists on what
performance-based standards to use to assess rating agencies." 4 6
Moreover, any attempt by the SEC to establish performance standards for CRAs would probably increase "already strong herding effects" among CRAs by giving them "even greater incentives to walk
in lockstep with one another." 4 7
Given the shortcomings of the various approaches studied by the
GAO, Manns proposes two new policy options to improve the performance of CRAs. First, the SEC should encourage a breakup of the
leading CRAs by mandating that only specialist firms may issue credit
ratings for asset-backed securities and other designated types of debt
securities. 4 8 Such a mandate would undermine the current "rating
agency oligopoly" by giving the leading rating agencies the "choice of
vacating segments of the market or spinning off parts of their business
into freestanding companies." 49
Second, Congress should increase the accountability of CRAs to
investors by establishing a gross negligence standard of liability for
CRAs together with a statutory cap on damages (based on a specified
42

Id. at 763, 778.

43

Id. at 784.

44

Id. at 788-89.

45

48

Id. at 790.
Id.
Id. at 794.
Id. at 801.

49

Id. at 803. An alternative approach would be to create an independent selection board

46
47

that would give preferences to smaller CRAs in allocating ratings business. Id. at 805.
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multiple of a CRA's annual fees).so A gross negligence standard
would encourage greater private monitoring through investor lawsuits, while capped damages would prevent such litigation from bankrupting CRAs.51 In view of Dodd-Frank's incomplete and
contradictory reforms, Manns contends that his proposals are needed
to "foster greater competition and accountability" for CRAs.5 2
Adam Levitin's article considers Dodd-Frank's "skin-in-thegame" provision, which requires originators of securitized loans to
"retain 5% of the risk in the assets they securitize." 53 As Levitin
points out, the skin-in-the-game requirement is based on the assumption that "if the parties engaged in securitization are required to retain
some credit risk on the securitized loans, they will be incentivized to
ensure that the securitized loans are of higher quality." 54 He questions whether that assumption is accurate, based on his analysis of
credit card securitizations.5 5
Levitin observes that originators of securitized credit card loans
had strong incentives for "rate-jacking" (i.e., imposing sudden increases in interest rates or fees on outstanding credit card loans) until
Congress imposed tight restrictions on that practice in 2009.56 Due to
the special terms of credit card securitizations, which included the
originators' retention of four percent to seven percent of the credit
risk, originators could capture "the entire potential upside" of ratejacking and were "exposed to only a fraction of the losses" from any
increase in borrower defaults that rate-jacking might cause.57 Levitin
asks why, in view of these apparently lopsided and perverse incentives, originators of credit card loans engaged in only a limited amount
of rate-jacking.58 He explains that the originators' business model depended on their ability to obtain continuous funding from investors.59
Originators therefore provided "implicit recourse," in the form of additional discretionary financial support, to ensure the performance of
outstanding issues of securities backed by credit card loans.60 Because
Id. at 809.
Id.
52 Id. at 812.
53 Adam J. Levitin, Skin-in-the-Game: Risk Retention Lessons from Credit Card Securitizations, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 813, 815 (2013) (discussing Section 941 of Dodd-Frank).
54 Id. at 816 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 816-17.
57 Id. at 817, 844.
58 Id. at 817.
59 Id. at 826.
60 Id. at 847.
50
51

670
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of implicit recourse, originators were more exposed to the risk of borrower defaults than their formal retention of credit risk indicated.6'
Accordingly, they had much weaker incentives to engage in opportunistic rate-jacking behavior that would increase borrower defaults and
thereby injure investors. 62
The disciplining role played by implicit recourse in credit card
securitizations does not necessarily apply to securitizations of mortgages because mortgage-backed securities do not rely as heavily on
continuous funding by investors. 63 Levitin is therefore concerned that
Dodd-Frank's "solution to moral hazard" may not work for mortgagebacked securities because a skin-in-the-game requirement is probably
not sufficient by itself to provide adequate protection for investors. 64
Todd Zywicki's article presents a strong challenge to the new
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB"), established by Title X of Dodd-Frank. 65 Zywicki contends that the CFPB's design represents "the return of a discredited view of agency design" that was
abandoned after the early 1970s. 66 In his view, the CFPB is an "unaccountable agenc[y]" with "extreme independence" 67 because of: (1) its
single-director leadership model and the protection of its director
from removal except for cause; 68 (2) the insulation of the CFPB's
budget from the congressional appropriations process, due to the
CFPB's guaranteed funding from the Federal Reserve System;69
(3) the fact that the CFPB's decisions can be overturned only by a
two-thirds vote of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and only if
those rules "would seriously threaten the safety and soundness of the
United States banking system or put the stability of the financial system of the United States at risk;"70 and (4) the deference that courts
are statutorily required give to the CFPB "regarding the meaning or
interpretation of any provision of a Federal consumer financial law."7
Id.
Id. at 847-48.
63 Id. at 825-26.
64 Id. at 855.
65 Todd Zywicki, The Consumer FinancialProtectionBureau: Savior or Menace?, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 856, 857-59 (2013); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. X, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (entitled "Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection").
66 See Zywicki, supra note 65, at 857.
67 Id. at 875.
68 Id. at 873-74.
69 Id. at 872-73.
70 Id. at 874 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
61

62
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In view of these structural features, Zywicki describes the CFPB
as "a virtual poster child for an agency design that eventually will be
likely to manifest the bureaucratic pathologies that led to the disastrous regulatory policies that were abandoned in the 1970s."72 He
warns that the CFPB's "tunnel vision focus" on consumer protection
will lead to "overzealous regulation" and will cause the CFPB to place
an "undue focus on the Bureau's narrowly defined consumer protection mission while discounting the benefits to consumers of lower
prices, greater choice and innovation, and more robust competition."73
In this regard, Zywicki points to the CFPB's "misplaced obsession with simplicity over functionality" as reflected by its "initial proposal to create a preferred menu of 'plain vanilla' credit offerings for
consumers." 74 He argues that "one cannot simply assume that complex loan products provide a vehicle for lenders to exploit hapless borrowers,"75 and he cites studies by economists concluding that: (1) most
consumers readily understand credit card terms and find it easy to
switch between competing credit cards;76 and (2) "'predatory lending'
was not a primary cause of the financial crisis."77
In Zywicki's view, "the architects of CFPB seem to be largely
unaware of the fact that much of the dysfunction in the consumer protection system that they criticize resulted from excessive regulation
and litigation."78 Zywicki predicts that the CFPB will produce "continued regulatory complexity combined with new substantive limits on
loan terms and a resurgence of paternalistic regulation."79 What is
"most threatening," in his view, is the CFPB's "power to regulate unfair, deceptive, or abusive" consumer financial products.80 Although
the terms "unfair" and "deceptive" have acquired established meanings from their longstanding use by the Federal Trade Commission,
"abusive" is "an entirely novel term with no forerunners in any prior
federal or state statute or regulation."81 If the CFPB adopts a broad
definition of the "abusive" standard, it could expose lenders "to po72

Id. at 872.

73

Id. at 876-77, 880, 882.

74

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

75
76
77
78
79

903.

904.
903 nn.249-50 and accompanying text.
904.
907.
908.

80 Id. at 917-18.

81 Id. at 918.
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tentially massive liability" while also "chilling innovation of new products with the eventual impact being felt by consumers."8 2
Zywicki also criticizes other provisions of Dodd-Frank, which
permit "federal authorities to potentially reach down to regulate the
operations of exceedingly local lenders (such as payday lenders)" and
authorize "redundant enforcement actions by state and local governments with no coherent division of authority" but only a single purpose "to maximize litigation and enforcement."8 3 In his view, the
CFPB, along with other provisions of Title X, will likely generate "excessive and unresponsive regulation [that] raises the price of, and
reduces access to, high-quality credit, while also harming precisely
those that the regulations were purportedly intended to help."8 4
Theresa Gabaldon's article offers a contrasting perspective on the
CFPB, as she argues that the CFPB's consumer protection mission
provides an opportunity to revisit the characterization of bounded rationality as a problem extrinsic to corporate law.85 She begins with the
important observation that corporate law traditionally not only fails to
recognize that there are easily manipulable "bounds" on rationality,86
but it also overlooks how corporations have been left virtually free to
create the very preferences that they seek to satisfy. 7 She then argues
that the CFPB provides a vehicle for altering this dynamic. Specifically, the CFPB has "broad regulatory and general education mandates that could justify a variety of reforms" aimed at preventing
"unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices directed at financial
consumers." 8 Consistent with those mandates, Professor Gabaldon
proposes that the CFPB should adopt a procedure to certify providers
of financial products "as subscribing to corporate decisionmaking
practices designed to be less injurious to consumer interests than the
82

Id. at 920.

83

Id. at 924.

Id. at 927. For differing views, which provide more positive assessments of the CFPB
and Dodd Frank's expansion of state authority to protect consumers, see Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., The Financial Services Industry's Misguided Quest to Undermine the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, 31 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 881 (2012); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The DoddFrank Act's Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers of FinancialServices, 36 J. CORP.
L. 893 (2011).
85 Theresa A Gabaldon, Half-A-Cup Better than None: A PragmaticApproach to Preventing the Abuse of Financial Consumers, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 929 (2013).
84

86

Id. at 931.

See id. ("[I]f corporations are creating the very preferences they satisfy, the foxes are
not only guarding the hen houses, they are running the farms.").
87

88

Id. at 932.
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usual shareholder primacy model historically has dictated."89 In her
view, such a proposal properly acknowledges the limits of rationality
as well as corporate law's potential exploitation of those limits. 90 At
the same time, the disclosure-based nature of her proposal fits neatly
into the limited role claimed by the federal government in recent
years to improve corporate governance procedures. 91
In their article, James Cotter, Alan Palmiter, and Randall
Thomas provide important insights about the impact of Dodd-Frank's
"say-on-pay" provision in altering pay practices at individual companies and-perhaps more importantly-in shifting the relationship between management and shareholders in U.S. companies generally. 92
In response to concerns that executive pay in U.S. public companies
had become excessive and may have even created perverse incentives,
section 951 of Dodd-Frank requires larger U.S. public companies to
give their shareholders the right to an advisory vote on the prior
year's pay of the top five executives in the company-a "say on
pay."9 3 Cotter, Palmiter, and Thomas empirically assess the impact of
section 951 by analyzing proxy voting data from Russell 3000 companies 94 during the first year of say-on-pay as well as case studies from
the second year of "say-on-pay." 95 While supporters hoped that sayon-pay votes would curb inappropriate pay practices, 96 opponents
feared that say-on-pay votes would have a negative impact on compensation practices and upset the balance of authority between boards
and shareholders in ways that would prove problematic. 97
On the one hand, the authors found that in the first year of sayon-pay, shareholders in general broadly supported management pay
practices. 98 On average, say-on-pay proposals received approval from
more than ninety percent of shareholders casting votes.99 On the
Id. at 933, 953.
90 See id. at 952.
91 See id. at 933.
92 James F. Cotter, Alan R. Palmiter, and Randall S. Thomas, The First Year of Say-onPay under Dodd-Frank:An EmpiricalAnalysis and Look Forward,81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967,
967 (2013).
93 Id. at 968-69; see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)).
94 See Cotter, Palmiter & Thomas, supra note 92, at 979 n.68 (defining the Russell 3000 as
an index "measuring the performance of the largest 3000 U.S. companies representing approximately 98% of the investable U.S. equity market") (internal quotation marks omitted).
95 Id. at 969-70, 979-81.
96 Id. at 973-74.
97 Id. at 974-75.
98 Id. at 979.
89

99 Id.
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other hand, not all executive pay packages received strong support,
and a few pay packages (approximately 1.3%) were even voted
down.100 The authors found that poorly performing companies with
high levels of "excess" executive pay, low total shareholder returns,
and negative voting recommendations from third party advisory firms
experienced greater percentages of negative shareholder votes.101 Despite the nonbinding nature of "say-on-pay" votes, the authors found
that negative third party recommendations and negative shareholder
votes prompted companies to alter their pay practices.102 Perhaps
more importantly, most companies receiving negative recommendations from third party advisory firms or otherwise experiencing low
levels of shareholder support undertook additional communications
with shareholders. 103 In this regard, say-on-pay votes have caused
management to be more responsive to shareholder concerns about executive pay and about corporate governance generally, thereby shifting the dynamics of management-shareholder communication.1 04 The
authors believe that this shift may be the most important consequence
of say-on-pay thus far, and they suggest that it may be viewed as a
model of how procedural reforms "can catalyze company-by-company
negotiations and reforms."10 5
In her article, Hillary Sale analyzes Sarbanes-Oxley and DoddFrank to further develop her theory of "public governance"-the notion that the parties traditionally involved with regulating the corporation (i.e., state lawmakers who have relied heavily on self-governance
or private ordering by corporate officers, directors, and shareholders)
have expanded to include more external or public actors. 10 6 Her theory of public governance recognizes that the governance of corporations is shifting from a system based primarily on private ordering to
one involving more public decisionmaking.107
Sale's article reveals the manner in which Sarbanes-Oxley and
Dodd-Frank have contributed significantly to this shift. While federal
law has long played a role in the regulation of corporations, it tradi100 Id. at 979-80.
101 Id. at 991-92.

at 969.
103 Id. at 969, 995.
102 Id.

at 995.
at 1011.
106 Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1012, 1013-14 (2013). Sale
refers to this theory as "publicness." Id. at 1013.
104 Id.

105 Id.

107 Id.
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tionally focused primarily on disclosure rather than on substance. 08
However, Sarbanes-Oxley dramatically altered this focus by directly
imposing federal-law duties and decisionmaking responsibilities on
corporate officers and directors, thereby removing the "privilege of
self-regulation from the private actors."109 Similarly, Dodd-Frank directly intervenes in corporate governance, particularly with respect to
its regulations related to executive compensation." 0 After examining
the growing "publicness" of corporate law, Sale argues that "corporate failures result in publicness" because those failures highlight
shortcomings in lawmakers' choices about private ordering and selfregulation, while at the same time generating pressure for more public
governance and reform."'

Drawing on lessons gleaned from Sarbanes-Oxley and DoddFrank, James Cox's article advances a proposal for strengthening financial reporting by enhancing the auditor's opinion letter.112 He
points out that section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley responded to concerns
about inaccuracies in financial statements by requiring managers of
public companies to assess and report on their companies' internal
financial controls and by requiring independent auditors to attest annually to managements' internal control assessments." 3 Those twin
requirements triggered an immediate backlash from critics who
charged Congress with "overreaction and overregulation."11 4 In addition, although studies examining the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley revealed that section 404 improved the quality and trustworthiness of
financial statements, they also revealed that such improvements involved significant costs.115
In response to the backlash against Sarbanes-Oxley, section 989G
of Dodd-Frank exempted nearly 6,000 companies from the internal
reporting requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley." 6 In addition, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012117 further reduced the scope
Id. at 1017.
109 Id. at 1021.
110 See id. at 1027-32.
11 Id. at 1034-35.
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112 James D. Cox, StrengtheningFinancialReporting: An Essay on Expanding the Auditor's
Opinion Letter, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1036 (2013).
113 Id. at 1038; see Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404(a)-(b), 116 Stat.
745, 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a)-(b) (2012)).
114 Cox, supra note 112, at 1038.
115 Id. at 1043.
116 Id. at 1038-39.

117 Jumpstart Our Business Startups ("JOBS") Act, Pub.L.No. 112-106, 126 Stat 306 (2012)
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

676

[Vol. 81:663

of section 404's requirements.118 In Cox's view, these retrenchments
reveal that one byproduct of the last decade has been a growing distrust of regulation, which has led to growing calls for less government
involvement in corporate affairs-including the area of investor protection.1 9 In an effort to fashion a reform consistent with this climate,
Cox focuses on the auditor's opinion letter, and he pinpoints modest
steps that could be taken to ensure that the opinion letter provides
useful information to investors about the quality of a particular company's accounting reports and reporting system. 120 He also proposes a
"more robust response" in which "the PCAOB [would] require
mandatory rotation of auditors," and the SEC would mandate enhanced disclosures by management in public company reports about
"critical accounting assumptions, estimates, and judgments" as well as
"management's going-concern judgments."121

As shown by the nine articles published in this issue, scholars are
likely to analyze and debate the impact of Dodd-Frank and the legacy
of Sarbanes-Oxley for many years to come. We believe that this issue
will make an important contribution to that ongoing dialogue.
L.M.F.
A.E.W., Jr.
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